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Kalandula and the CACS – voice or accountability? 
This paper aims to present some of the findings from the first field work in the CMI-CEIC-ADRA 
research project on the Councils of Community Consultation and Cooperation (Conselhos de 
Auscultação e Concertação Social in Portuguese, abbreviated as CACS in singular and as CACSes 
in plural). The research took place during two weeks in Kalandula município, Malanje province, in 
November 2008.1 The findings and thoughts in this document are preliminary results only, and are 
meant to stimulate debate in workshops and ongoing research for comparative experiences in other 
provinces.   
 
Before presenting the data from Kalandula, some brief sections on the legal, political and 
institutional context is presented. In addition, some theoretical thoughts based on comparative 
research on the issue of new democratic councils are included, since the idea of a local level 
“consultative council” is not an Angolan invention. Hence, the document may also serve as a basis 
for further discussions in Angola about CACSes and local governance. 
 
In January 2007, the Angolan government issued Law-Decree 2/07 which establishes the legal 
framework for the organisation and functioning of the provincial governments, and the 
administrations of the municípios and the comunas.2 The present paper focuses on the CACS at the 
município level, the level which according to the government is supposed to be the focal point of 
change during the next few years.  
An idiosyncratic version of a participatory institution 
The CACSes in Angola have appeared in a context where the government has sought to increase 
participation and representation of non-state actors in local governance, at least nominally, and 
legally through the inclusion of CACSes in the law-decree 2/07. These actions or – at the very least, 
policy-statements – can be seen as a means to increase legitimacy for the local governance process 
through inclusiveness (voice) and transparency (a prerequisite for accountability).  
 
The legal opening for the CACSes and their de facto activation, if and when consistently 
implemented, provides new potential spaces for political and social change in Angola – in what has 
been dubbed the “participatory sphere”. In a review of similar experiences from many new and old 
democracies, researchers Cornwall & Coelho find that these “new democratic spaces” are:  
 
‘intermediate, situated as they are at the interface between the state and society; […] 
conduits for negotiation, information and exchange. They may be […] regarded by 
the state actors as their space into which citizens and their representatives are 
invited. Yet they may also be seen as spaces conquered by civil society demands for 
inclusion (Cornwall and Coelho 2007:1). 
 
                                                     
1 The team involved with field research for this paper consisted of CMI researchers Aslak Orre and Dr. Odd-Helge 
Fjeldstad as well as various staff members of ADRA in Kalandula. The team is grateful to Dir. Alves da Rocha (CEIC), 
whose courteous contact work in the Province of Malanje played a substantial part in making the research trip successful. 
Many thanks also to Vice-Governor Gaspar Neto for information and support. 
2 The law regulates the attributions and spheres of operation and functions of its respective administrative tiers, as well as 
going into some detail regarding its individual constituting offices (such as the provincial governors and the administrators 
of municípios and comunas). It also spells out some important aspects regarding the distribution of financial items such as 
central transfers and fees and taxes collected locally. 
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Or put simply, in the first case the question appears to be how much inclusion the state is willing to 
“give” (to citizens and their representatives). In the second case, the question is rather how much 
previously excluded citizens are able to “take” (how much voice and accountability can be 
ensured?). In practice, those will usually be interdependent processes. This “theoretic” exposition of 
things is a rephrasing of the situation found in Angola today: the government talks of “consultation” 
and “hearings” (auscultação) where NGOs and civil society activists speak of “increased 
participation and transparency” and sometimes even accountability (prestação de contas). 
Expectations are many and surely not commensurate.   
 
Otherwise is not to be expected in Angola, where the government led by MPLA and President dos 
Santos has been used to governing without systematic or institutionalised correction: neither from 
parliament (which is totally controlled by the MPLA party), nor from the local governance system 
(since all local government officials – at province, municipio and comuna levels – are appointed by 
the President or Minister of Territorial Administration rather than elected). And no forums of 
systematic dialogue or deliberation have existed between government (local or central) and civil 
society representatives. The particular authoritarian history of colonialism and subsequent wars did 
little to create an atmosphere conducive for “community consultation” or for transparency and 
accountability.  
 
In most other developing countries, the “deepening of democracy” debate, and the ensuing creation 
of new institutions in the participatory sphere, has taken place in a context where established 
electoral institutions and the legal guarantee of certain rights have proved disappointing or 
otherwise insufficient – a crisis of democracy, so to say. The new “participatory sphere” then caught 
the interest of civil society activists and academics as ways to improve governance and impact 
positively on the lives of the majority of (poor) citizens by “deepening democracy” itself. The 
typical cases often referred to are from the poverty-stricken areas of Latin-America or India 
(Gaventa 2007:xii). What distinguishes the current process of institutional creation in local 
governance in Angola is that the recent reforms have taken place in a local governance setting 
where no previous structures of even nominal electoral institutions exist, and where local 
government leaders have hardly ever had the political, legal or personal motives to be accountable 
to the local citizens. Rhetorically put: when was the time to get disappointed with (local) elections 
in Angola? 
 
Is Angola then, trying to “skip a stage” in the typical historical trajectory of local democratization? 
Or is it applying lessons from other contexts effectively, justifiably bypassing discredited 
institutions of locally elected leadership? Is the drive to implement the CACS a strategic choice to 
prepare the ground for future local elections? Or is the current process in Angola a case of putting 
the cart before the horse while in waiting for the locally elected autarquia institutions to be 
implemented? These questions are still up for debate, as the government has been absolutely silent 
as to why it chose this particular institutional configuration when reforming local governance with 
law-decree 02/07.  
 
A series of fundamental questions about democratizing local governance in Angola easily comes to 
mind when researching on the CACSes in Angola. For instance, their embryonic character as formal 
institutions begs the question about their moment of conception. Who wanted the CACSes to be 
created as they were, and for which reasons? Was the idea to give local (rural) citizens increased 
voice in local governance through some form of representation on the councils? Or rather, was the 
idea to go a step further than simply hearing the councillors’ (representatives’) opinions, and to 
create a mechanism whereby local peoples’ representatives could hold government bureaucrats to 
account? Or are the addition of the CACS to the law-decree 2/07 merely window dressing – para o 
Inglês ver? Whatever their limitations at conception, is it realistic that democratically minded 
people could “seize the opportunity” provided by the creation of the councils and radically 
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transform them into veritable tools for ensuring that local governance is exercised more in 
accordance with ordinary people’s needs, wants and interests?  
 
None of these questions will be fully answered in the below exposition of the findings from 
Kalandula, but are worth keeping in mind for the analysis of its significance as a case study. Many 
democracy activists in Angola will hesitate to seriously consider these fundamental questions, since 
it always appears easier to work with and improve on existing structures and “rules of the game” as 
laid out by the mighty government, rather than challenge the whole edifice. More humdrum 
questions – such as those about the quality of meetings and procedures, the representativity of 
members and the relevance of the topics discussed, all dealt with in the text below – will be high on 
the local CACS-promoters’ minds in the near future.  
 
Nevertheless, taking a birds’ eye perspective on the process is likely to provide answers and ideas 
obscured by the day-to-day struggle for improved governance.  
Legal framework  
Before proceeding to present some of the findings from Kalandula, it is necessary to take a brief 
look at what the law says about the município-level CACS.3  
 
The CACS is presented in the law as a body that is to give “consultative support” (apoio consultívo) 
to the município administrator. That the CACS is presented alongside the “technical” and 
“instrumental” support functions to the executive leaves it precious little autonomy, at least from a 
law-in-the-book standpoint. It is supposed to support the administration and help it take action in 
matters of political, economic and social character. The administrator will preside over the council, 
summon the meetings and set the agenda. 
 
The CACS should be heard in three vital moments of local governance: in the development of the 
município development plan, activity plan and in the report on the execution of the activities of the 
administration. This provides for new levels of would-be accountability.  
 
According to the law, the councils shall be composed of “members” (there is a constant reference to 
membros of the council – clearly giving it a flavour of permanence). In addition to the município 
administrator, the members from the executive’s side are: 
 
a) The  assistant município administrator  
b) all comuna administrators in that município 
c) the sector heads (chefes de repartição), such as agriculture, health and education 
 
Representatives of the following categories of people outside of the administration should also be 
members of the councils (in the sequence the law mentions them):  
 
d) Traditional authorities 
e) Private or public business sector 
f) Peasant’s associations 
g) Registered churches  
h) NGOs  
i) “Other invited” people.  
                                                     
3 Articles 50 and 54 in the law. See the full legal text on the município CACS in annex. 
CMI WORKING PAPER KALANDULA AND THE CACS WP 2009: 5 
 4 
The law makes no mention of how or which mechanisms should decide who is selected or elected 
as representatives to the councils. Finally, the law states that the councils should meet every three 
months.  
 
Before venturing on to present details from the Kalandula CACS, it is worth mentioning the status 
of CACS in the province of Malanje.  
The provincial CACS in Malanje 
According to the law, a CACS has been established at the provincial level, presided by the 
Governor of the Malanje province. In addition to the entities stipulated in the law, representatives 
from the parties with parliamentary representation before the September 2008 elections were invited 
to the provincial CACS. This meant that the provincial leaders of some of the established parties 
who fell out of parliament that year also feared they would lose their seat on the provincial CACS. 
 
According to various CACS members, the only item that had been up for discussion was 
information and review of the provincial government’s programme. However, one invitation 
document to the CACS meeting on the 6th of June 2008 that was made available for the researchers 
brought out some interesting indicators of the process.  
 
All three points on the agenda was presented as “information” from the government to the council. 
The first point on the agenda was a review of the activities of the provincial government in the first 
trimester as compared to its programme. Importantly, the invitation also carried an attachment were 
the government’s achievements had been presented according to sectors. Though not amounting to 
information easy to scrutinize for members of the council, it surely displayed a commitment to 
transparency. The two last points on the agenda were “information” on the electoral registration 
process and the arms collection campaign. The leaders of the opposition parties – members of the 
council – complained that the council was only convened irregularly, and only when convoked by 
the Governor (who was, at the time, also the 1st provincial secretary of the MPLA party). 
Nevertheless, Unita insisted that the council had led to increased accountability and that their 
opinions were taken into account. The other opposition parties expressed the opposite. 
CACS in the municipios in Malanje province 
It proved difficult to gather certain information about CACSes in the other 14 municípios of 
Malanje with which the Kalandula CACS could be compared, since no publicly available written 
summary exists about the province’s CACS. For our analytical purposes, we are interested in the 
CACSes which since 2007 have been institutionalized, at least to the extent that they have had two 
regularly convoked meetings and some resemblance of an established membership. According to 
many informed sources, apart from Kalandula, only the município of Cacuso appears to have held 
regular CACS meetings. This contrasts to the view of some interviewees in the provincial 
government that a CACS existed in all the province’s municípios – which we hold as unlikely 
unless one counts in CACSes with only a nominal “paper existence”.   
 
We were able to establish that in the município of Malanje city only one meeting had been held in 
the CACS, in April 2008. The membership had not yet been fixed, and no minutes were written. 
Those who were present at the first meeting were, apparently, in addition to many leaders of the 
administration: A few traditional authorities (regedores), a few peasants’ associations, church 
organizations, NGOs, and some political parties.  
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One of the reasons why the CACS didn’t take place before was that Malanje was left without an 
administrator since august 2007 – when the last one was exonerated – until April 2008, when the 
new one was established. The subsequent period of transtornos [that is, abnormal situation of 
disturbances] – the elections, the periods of absence of the new administrator, the arrival of the new 
Governor – was given as the grounds for not holding more meetings.  
The Kalandula CACS and its immediate context 
Município de Kalandula 
The Kalandula município4 is located to the north-west of the provincial capital of Malanje. Its 7037 
km2 hosts some ninety thousand inhabitants, an eyebrow-raising figure when comparing it to the 
pre-war population of 140 000. The small town of Kalandula itself lays at about 85 km from 
Malanje. Kalandula town is built around the single main-street originating from the colonial time. 
This main street harbours the newly built município administration, the refurbished palácio of the 
administrator, the brand new administration building, the police command, some four trader shops, 
a gas station and the only hotel. There is no industry in the município. Kalandula is known first and 
foremost for a natural phenomenon: The Quedas de Kalandula, the cataracts which are, ostensibly, 
second in Africa only to the Victoria Falls.   
 
In 2007 the UNDP financed research and the development of a “profile” of the Kalandula 
município. It was organized by external consultants and printed in glossy colours. In principle the 
profile should – having taken stock of existing human and natural resources, as well as citizens’ and 
environmental needs – give rise to a município development plan. A document entitled a 
“development plan” was provided for the researchers, but amounts to little more than an activity list 
without time frames, budgets or attribution of responsibilities.  
 
The município is subdivided in 5 comunas (Kalandula town, Kota, Kinje, Kateco Kangola, Kuale) 
and then in regedorias. Each of the comunas, except for the town, is headed by a comuna 
administrator. The regedorias, each of which can consist of tens or hundreds of villages, are (in 
practice, but without legal reference) headed by regedores, who answer to a regedor comunal 
(meaning, the head regedor of the comuna, the comuna administrator’s contact point to the many 
regedores and sobas).  
 
The Administration is, not unlike most other municípios, painfully in need of qualified staff. The 
município only employs 38 staff members, of which only 4 have the level of técnico médio or 
higher (though this figure excludes some technicians in the Health, Agriculture and Education 
sectors). It is in light of this that the Administration has invested considerable public resources into 
setting up improved homes to attracted more qualified staff.  
 
In 2008, Kalandula was chosen among the 68 municípios in Angola – and among four in Malanje 
province – to become, for the first time, budgetary units of the state budget. This made it eligible to 
receive a block grant amounting to the equivalent of USD 5 million from central government funds. 
To which extent this sum was made available to the local administration (and the município 
inhabitants), will be dealt with below.  
Kalandula was among the first few municípios that received support from the UNDP as part of its 
decentralization and municipal development programme. This support dates back to 2004, when the 
                                                     
4 When discussing local government structures in Angola it is preferable to use the Portuguese denominations of 
municípios and comunas, rather than to attempt translations into English, as the English corollaries ‘municipality’ and 
‘commune’ could bring about unwarranted associations with the reader. 
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município administration started to receive training and administrative infrastructures such as 
computers, furniture, and buildings. The administrator was invited to study trips with peers to local 
governments in Cape Verde and Portugal. Several of the staff members at the administration 
received long and several short term training courses in Luanda. In addition, a young UNDP staff 
member briefly resided in Kalandula in 2006 and was supposed to back up the município 
development programme. However, the UNDP cadre left the município prematurely, and without 
having made any significant achievements. As a precursor to the CACS, the administration had 
instituted a conselho municipal some years ago, with irregular meetings. 
 
The following information is drawn from direct observations and interviews during the ten days of 
field work in Kalandula in the beginning of November 2008. Very little written documentation was 
forwarded. In particular, only one of the minutes of the meetings in the CACS was made available 
to the team, despite being of particular interest to this study.  
 
By November 2008 there had been three meetings in the Kalandula CACS. The first one took place 
in April 2008, the second in July, and the last one on the 24th of October. The “membership” of the 
CACS was changing in composition, with the government representatives providing the most stable 
element.  
 
It is fair to say, as an overall opener, that the CACS council was only embryonic still in November 
2008. None of the citizens we talked to casually had any inkling about the existence of a CACS 
(much less its complicated wording), or at all that there was such a thing as a council. People who 
could be expected to be relatively well informed, like coordinators of the peasant associations, had 
not heard of the CACS. Even a supposed member of the CACS did not recognise having 
participated in such a council. 
The politico-administrative culture 
According to various voices, the Kalandula município administration was quite “closed” or 
inaccessible. Despite having been a município with special attention from UNDP there is, in short, 
no sign that the UNDP project did lead to fundamental changes in the governance culture or shift 
decision-making power or financial resources from the provincial to the município level (the 
investment in the Administration’s infrastructure and know-how appears to have been the principal 
results). One source blamed this on lack of political will with the provincial authorities. To our 
research, it is uncertain whether such a resistance emanates from the province, or from further down 
the apparatus of the local organs of the state.  
 
To provide an explanation for what many identified as “resistance” to change or the durability of 
old ways of governance, one is tempted to highlight three features of administrative culture and 
power relations, as these have been limiting factors in other experiments with citizen-state “spaces 
for change”. According to Cornwall and Coelho (2007:24):  
 
“Our studies show that pervasive inequalities in power and knowledge and 
embedded political cultures pose considerable challenges for creating inclusive 
deliberative fora. They suggest that even in cases where there is considerable 
political will to ensure the viability of these institutions, inequalities of power and 
knowledge and embedded technocracy affect their democratizing prospects.” 
 
The most defining characteristic of local governance in Kalandula is, as in most places in Angola, 
the close links between the state administration and the ruling MPLA party. This link was 
personified in the Administrator, who also serves as the 1st secretary of MPLA in Kalandula 
município. The 2nd secretary of MPLA is the head of the education sector. There are also 
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connections between the MPLA party and the people at SINFO (state information services), the 
police, and lastly with the traditional authorities (who, being paid by the state/MPLA, also tend to 
be associated with state power, more often than not displaying the MPLA banner on a pole outside 
their huts).  
 
Another feature of the administrative culture is the continuing dominance of the Administrator as a 
person, perpetuating a culture of big-manism, even though – and this we want to stress – the 
administrator in Kalandula does not appear to be personally cultivating such and image. With 
financial decentralization and the arrival of the 5 million dollars to the município, then – if anything 
– the culture of dependence on the Administration intensified, with all resources worth mentioning 
arrive through the Administrator.5 He and a close knit staff creates the investment plan (after 
consultation with the CACS members) and executes it through contracting; he hires more people 
than anyone in the município; he presides over the CACS; he hosts parties and national celebrations 
and lives in the newly refurbished palacio, a considerable villa for a town the size of Kalandula. In 
the palácio garden one could find four new generators, three large and three small tractors, and four 
grinding mills – in short, the bulk of the new investments acquired by the município. It might be 
that the machinery was placed there, if only temporarily, for reasons of convenience, expediency 
and security. Still, it does create a visible manifestation of the origins of the machinery, and this 
display of  “cargo” does little to clarify things for citizens – who from the outset have vague 
conceptions about the distinction between state property and resources, and those of the 
“dirigentes” (a popular expression denominating the state and party elite).  
 
The third feature worth mentioning is the close link between the administration and the “traditional 
authorities” – the regedores and the sobas. When asked about the role of the sobas and regedores, 
they always present themselves as a sort of “messengers” between the government and the 
“communities” (as they express it) as well as “controlling” the communities. They see themselves, 
confirmed by most others, as simultaneously representatives of the government in the 
“communities” and representatives of the “communities” before the government. This position as 
“intermediaries” in Kalandula is certainly not unique in Angola or in other African countries – it is a 
most interesting feature of rural socio-political organization. As local authorities, they appear to be 
still exercising real power in many fields of village-level life, drawing on customary notions of law 
and norms as well as the legal order of the state. However, the hundreds of sobas and regedores in 
Kalandula are paid by the state, something which draws them ever closer to the administrative 
apparatus, and puts them in a position of dependency. 6 Most sobas in Kalandula also display the 
banner of the ruling MPLA-party outside their houses. Consequently, the border between the 
“traditional authorities” and state and party power is certainly blurred. It also has the effect that it is 
deeply problematic – at the very least – to simply portray the sobas as the representatives of their 
communities (as frequently done in discussions about the CACSes). 
 
These are features of the politico-administrative culture that the UNDP and its project were in no 
position to easily change.7 This is not to say that there has been no change in Kalandula, or that 
there has been no result of the UNDP support. 
 
                                                     
5 A possible objection to this brush statement is that many jobs and resources, including the town’s electricity, are 
provided by the new and large town hotel, ostensibly owned by Mr. Kapunga – a rich businessman and MPLA Member of 
Parliament.  
6 The research team observed two sessions of public ceremonies involving many sobas as well as the município 
administration: the 11th of November celebrations as well as next day when some 40 sobas and regedores of the município 
sede converged on the administration to receive their trimonthly “subsidies”. The very subservient behavior of the sobas 
vis-à-vis the administration was unfailing. 
7 It is worth questioning if the consequences of such an analysis were significantly considered and baked into the UNDP 
project as it was being conceived and executed.  
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For all its training efforts and equipment, the readiness of the Kalandula administration to host a 
CACS is certainly the most significant institutional reform. With the founding of the CACS in early 
2008, it was the first time other citizens than members of the government entities or the traditional 
authorities had been invited to a formal council before the administration. It was also the first time a 
public investment programme had been announced and put up for discussion to the “public” – 
insofar as the CACS representatives could be seen as the “public” – before the investments took off. 
It presented to the CACS members a somewhat detailed budget, one that was available to the 
município in its entirety and up for discussion. This fact alone has certainly sown a seed of 
increased transparency.   
 
The CACS has its precursor in the Council of the Município, dating a few years back and clearly 
inspired by the influence of the UNDP programme. It was unclear how regular these councils had 
been held. Rather more regularly it happened that the administrator summoned the council of 
traditional authorities (mostly the regedores). 
Composition 
The membership composition of the CACS seems to follow the law (2/07) in its stipulations on 
composition. The membership can be ordered in five categories, as referred to in the law. It appears 
that the membership is solely composed of people specifically invited by the Administrator, either 
in personal capacity or as representatives of organizations. 
 
We take the list of participants during the March 1 2008 extraordinary meeting, of which minutes 
were obtained, as a point of departure.  
 
STATE AND GOVERNMENT: The administration (that is, the government) is represented by the 
município administrator and his assistant administrator; four comuna administrators; one member of 
the município administration’s secretariat; local representatives of the national ministries in the 
person of the chefe de secção (sector director) of, respectively, the industry and commerce, 
agriculture, education, health and the urban housing sectors; the head of the civil defence 
organization (ODC); the security services (SINFO) and lastly the Police Commander.  
 
TRADITIONAL AUTHORITIES: In the category of “traditional authority”, the four comuna regedores 
were invited to the first meeting, as well as the município regedor.  
 
NGOS AND CHURCHES: In the non-governmental – or “civil society” – category, only ADRA 
(Associação para o Desenvolvimento Rural e Ambiente) is represented as an NGO – the only one 
operating in Kalandula. There are four churches that each has a member in the CACS: The Catholic 
Church, the Adventist Church of the 7th Day, the African Methodist Church, and the Bom Deus 
Church. 
 
PRIVATE SECTOR: There are no business associations or trade unions in town, but the peasant’s 
associations are answered for by the UNACA-representative: the UNACA is a governmental 
organization set up to help peasants’ cooperatives. It was very hard to get consistent information 
about the representative of the towns’ traders: the comerciantes. Two women were pointed out by 
the administration as members to represent the traders. One of them could hardly recall having been 
at a meeting at the Administration at all. The other one said she had been told that although she was 
invited she had been “exchanged” for another person, who turned out to be Monteiro Kapunga – 
owner of the Kalandula hotel, one of the very rich men in Malanje and as from September 2008, 
parliamentary member for the MPLA.  
 
Summed up, the distribution of the 25 members (present) during the first meeting was:  
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• 12 state representatives 
• 6 traditional authorities 
• 3 NGO and church representatives 
• 4 representatives of the “private sector” 
 
What changed in the later meetings? The attendance was increased to around 40, according to the 
Administration’s claims8, with the bulk of the increase explained by the invitation of more 
regedores (traditional authorities). The Administration informed that in the later meetings, the 
membership had been expanded to include all the eighteen regedores, so as to ‘avoid trouble’. The 
regedores are usually assisted by a “secretary” who is, as is always mentioned, helping out the 
regedores who are more often than not illiterate. All in all, the same source now counted ‘almost 
45’ members of the CACS. He also went on to provide and explanation for not inviting more 
representatives of the several dozens of associations in the município. ‘We have to find a solution to 
the transport problem so that they can come to the meetings’.9 
 
The four political parties who are present in Kalandula with a local chapter with an office each were 
offered an invitation by the Administrator: The MPLA, Unita, PRS and PRD. The provincial 
leaderships of the latter two parties were unaware of, and doubted, the participation of any of their 
party members in the CACS. It seems, however, that at least once the Unita 1st secretary of 
Kalandula took part in a meeting. The Unita cadres we interviewed were unaware of the event, and 
doubted that their leader might have gone to such a meeting without their knowledge. According to 
one Administration member in the CACS, the PRS or the PRD had no real presence in the town 
(they only appeared shortly before the elections it was said) and so only a Unita member turned up 
at one meeting. When the local Unita chapter was asked about the CACS, no awareness of the 
CACS was acknowledged or any invitation to the same. It is reasonable to say that the various 
political parties have an uneasy relationship in Kalandula. Given that the GURN-government has 
been terminated, some expressed doubts that the representatives of the political parties would be 
invited to the forthcoming meetings.   
 
What about the private sector? Some of the ‘entrepreneurs’ who had operated in the town were 
invited to the first few meetings. These had, however, ceased their membership as they no longer 
had any contracts in Kalandula. This questions the wisdom of inviting non-residing people as 
members to the council, something which also counts for the very rich hotel-owner. 
 
One admitted problem was the weak attendance of women. In the 1st of March meeting, the only 
woman member was invited as a representative of the traders in town (“private sector”). At later 
meetings, a representative of the Women’s Forum of Kalandula (Fórum da Mulher) appears to have 
taken part. It should be mentioned in that respect that several interviewees confirmed that the 
Women’s Forum had a somewhat paralysed existence for the time being, but that it was very close 
to the Administration and the Party organization. This is not surprising as the 1st Secretary of the 
Forum was the wife of the Administrator (and 1st Secretary of the MPLA) and the 2nd Secretary of 
the Forum was the wife of the 2nd Secretary of the MPLA. One staff member of the Administration 
explained the low percentage of women in the CACS as a consequence of the low number of 
women staff in the Administration – something that was beyond the local Administration’s control. 
Nevertheless, many women had active and leading roles in the agricultural associations which could 
be potential vocal members. 
                                                     
8 Recall, no written records or minutes were available for the posterior meetings. 
9 Here it should be kept in mind that some of the comunas and villages are located more than an hour’s drive away with a 
good car.  
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Agendas 
The three meetings had different agendas. In brief, the first meeting was to “take stock of the 
government’s activities”. The second was to define priorities on how to use the USD 5 million 
allotted to the município.  
 
We were given access to the minutes from the first meeting of the Kalandula CACS, on March 1, 
2008 – oddly presented as an “extraordinary” meeting. The minutes are worth quoting in some 
length, as they give an insight into the work of the council and the internal power relations. 
 
The minutes refer that the original agenda had the following points:  
 
1) Recommendations from the previous meeting (probably referring to the CACS’ precursor, the 
município council);  
2) presentation of the budget proposal for 2008;  
3) presentation of the 2008 budget for the hospital of the município;  
4) information about the education sector, a seminar in Luanda, the up-coming visit of the 
Minister of Public Works, a provincial meeting on the water sector investments, and 
5) the National Police’s anniversary.  
 
The minutes then refer that the agenda was set aside by the Administrator. Instead he proposed only 
two points: 1) Information about the council’s composition in light of the decree 2/07; and 2) 
Contract on the município programme between the [now in bold letters, AO] the Administrator of 
the Município and the Minister of Finance.  
 
On the first point, the minutes refer that the Administrator gave a “dissertation” (exposition) on 
what the law says about the council composition.10 
 
Under the second point on the agenda the Administrator announced that Kalandula had been 
promised the amount of 5 million USD, and that the money will go to the construction and 
rehabilitation of social infrastructure and to fight poverty.  
 
The convocation/invitation to the meetings arrived in writing to – at least – some of the members. 
However, one CACS member remarked that the invitations were never accompanied by an agenda. 
Structure 
The municipio Administrator is the president of the CACS. Little else information was forwarded 
about internal organization, but all sources explained that it was the Administrator who had the 
dominant role, and who directed the meeting procedures. 
The CACS in Kalandula has no permanent sub-bodies, like working-groups. This is interesting 
insofar as such working groups could have been necessary instruments to train its members in 
scrutinizing the Administration’s actions.  
 
Several people commended the Administrator for ensuring that the members were treated with 
lunch and refreshments during the sessions. 
                                                     
10 The minutes say: “No tocante ao ponto um, o Sr. Administrador Municipal fez uma breve dissertação baseada na 
Seccão I do Capítulo IV do Decreto Lei nº 2/07 concretamente o seu artigo 54 que determina a sua composição.” 
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Participation 
All interviewees confirm that it is the CACS president (the Administrator) who speaks most. 
Thereafter follows the regedores who bring out their concerns from their own comunidades. 
However, as one member of the administration put it: “the regedores still behave as invited guests”. 
In the context of Angola, it would still be unrealistic to expect, however, that more than a minority 
would quickly overcome past traditions of submission and speak up. One key informant told us, 
‘most of the members go there to hear rather than opine’, and that ‘civil society is still too timid’.  
 
Nevertheless, the minutes of the March 1 meeting refer that there was held a brain-storming session 
apparently to hear about the representatives “concerns” (preocupações). The ideas brought forward 
amounted to a “wish-list” for necessary acquisitions: Tractors and other machines, cattle, building 
materials for social infrastructure, electrical pumps (for irrigation), rehabilitation of specific road 
stretches, generators for the comunas and grind-mills to ease the work-load on women.   
 
This was referred as a profound discussion before the meeting issued some recommendations, three 
of which were actually phrased as action points for the Administration concerning the new 
acquisitions, and two as action points for the traditional authorities – which both were actions to 
promote moral and education in the “communities” (as comunidades).  
 
Indeed, several interviewees from the administration confirmed that the most effervescent meeting 
was the first one which elaborated on the investment projects.  
 
Meanwhile, when opening interviews about CACS with the sobas interviewed, they all immediately 
started to talk about the tractor-issue (see section below). This could not but leave the impression 
that the sobas’ first thought of the CACS was as a mechanism to release such a precious resource as 
mechanised traction to till the land. It was rather complicated to conduct a discussion about the 
CACS from any other angle.  
Decision-making 
In the “constitutive” meeting of the CACS on March 1 2008, the minutes report that the 
Administrator highlighted that the CACS is merely a consultative, not a deliberative organ: 
 
Por outro lado clarificou os participantes que o Conselho Municipal é um órgão de 
consulta e de apoio ao desempenho do Administrador da gestão da coisa pública e 
não deliberativo, quer dizer não toma decisões respeitantes aos problemas globais 
do município.  
 
Referring to the law text, the Administrator confirmed this opinion in interviews. However, in the 
October 24 meeting of the CACS, there was one example where the CACS had made a decision, 
partly on its own. After the Administrator had announced that the three new tractors acquired by the 
Administration now “belonged” to the CACS, in the sense of letting the CACS manage the use of 
the tractors, the CACS provided at least some guidance to their management. The CACS then 
decided that the tractors would be rented out, with tractor drivers, for the price of 15 000 kwanza 
per hectare worked. This system had been instituted as from October,11 but was apparently an 
improvement on a previous tractor rental scheme operated by the public enterprise Mecanagro, 
which had caused some dissatisfaction.  
 
                                                     
11 Yet there were already several complaints that the tractors had somehow been “diverted” from public benefit. 
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The agenda of the meeting that was planned for December 2008 is worth mentioning. The prime 
item on the agenda would be a discussion and approval of a Code of Conduct (Código de Postura) 
to be implemented – according to the Administrator – almost as a by-law after the CACS has 
approved it. The Administrator had already drafted a Código de Postura, inspired on texts from 
Cape Verde and Portugal. The proposal text is massive, counting 182 articles over 51 pages. It is 
mostly a collection of do’s and quite a lot more don’ts, and most articles and sub-points are armed 
with a whole array of possible fees (taxas) and fines (multas) for infringements. The Administrator 
explained that these fees and fines will bring some income to the município which it can keep for its 
own benefit, although the most important function of the code of conduct would be its regulatory 
effects on people’s behaviour.12 He added, though, that even if the CACS is not a deliberative 
organ, he expected that the CACS would make changes to the text, and reiterated that it would only 
be validated by the CACS’ approval. 
Expanding the CACS? 
We have argued above that the membership of the CACS in Kalandula is deficient from the point of 
view of representation and accountability. The model of representation adopted in Angola is quite 
“corporatist” – that is, representatives come from predetermined “interest groups” or just “groups”, 
like “communities”.  For now, this corporatist model of representation stands, as long as election 
based representation is not on the agenda.  
 
In which ways could some of these shortcomings be met within the parameters of the current law?  
 
Firstly, attention to the way the members are selected is vital. A committee of respected members 
tending to suggest innovative methods of choosing representatives – short of full suffrage elections 
– could ensure improvements. It could increase the number of constituencies represented, and 
simultaneously establish some distance between the members and the Administrator (who invites 
the members). Alternatively, it is also possible to adopt a more complicated model of 
selecting/electing the CACS members at município level from bottom up, in a hierarchical structure 
starting at or below the comuna level. Such models have been tried out elsewhere in Africa 
(Uganda, Mozambique), with successes as well as failures. 
 
Secondly, a more permanent membership (with time-bound terms) would enhance the members’ 
self-esteem, confidence and knowledge of the government process. Permanent members would also 
be better equipped to scrutinize the government’s actions, even though invited by the Administrator.   
 
One evident group to be included would be the peasant farmers’ associations which ADRA have 
supported through many years. In different, yet in complementary ways from the sobas, the 
associations’ coordinators represent the interests of many people in rural life. 
Concluding remarks on representativity and accountability 
The very government is directing (dirigir) the CACSes. Perhaps civil society is too 
timid yet. But we cannot expect the CACSes to run ahead of developments of the 
rest of the country! We can’t expect the CACSes to be more advanced than the 
general situation. So if the CACSes are weak, it is the result of other weaknesses. 
There is an autocratic tendency in governance. But they have to give at least some 
                                                     
12 The researchers’ “lay-eyes” on the legal text instilled us with the perception that it should be reviewed by jurists to 
ensure its constitutionality. Another side question is if it is desirable to import law texts developed for an urban context in 
Europe into rural Angola.  
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semblance of democracy, to create the image that we are a democracy. But bit by 
bit, these new institutions will tighten around the government’s neck, and society 
will evolve.  
Senior civil servant, anonymous 
 
The institution of the CACS brings one major institutional advance which is confirmed by the study 
in Kalandula: It has the clear potential to instil a culture or expectation – that is, institutionalisation 
– that promotes increased transparency of governance. One consequence could also be more 
vertical accountability in the sense that the Administration has to be open about their plans and 
answer for their achievements. Even if only in a limited sense, and even if the gulf of knowledge 
and power between the state representatives and the other members makes real scrutiny of 
governance a long shot, regular CACS meetings have sown seeds for the transparency and 
accountability to grow. An extra bonus is that some horizontal accountability is introduced by 
inviting so many staff of the various state organs to the council.  
 
The institutionalization of the CACS, fragile as it is after only a few meetings, could prove to be 
one mechanism which could “loosen” the politico-administrative cultures, which we argued work as 
countervailing forces to a change towards transparent and accountable governance.  
 
It is important to note, however, that the above mentioned identification of the potential for 
increased voice and accountability does not automatically mean that the current institutional and 
legal framework will bring out the full potential envisaged for the discourses on democratic 
decentralisation and participatory local governance. Hence, this observation should not be taken as a 
confirmation that the right institutional recipe has been found in Angola, and that it is now a mere 
question of emending the current practices. 
 
Much is made in state and public discourse in Angola about the issue of participatory governance, 
which in particular internationally funded development organisations such as the UNDP and the 
Fundo de Acção Social (FAS) feeds into. With the exception of some of the experiences from Brazil 
and India (Heller 2001), there is not much evidence indicating that the export of the “participatory” 
models of governance by development agencies into adverse contexts have actually produced much 
in terms of popular empowerment.13  
 
Without being dismissive of the Kalandula reforms, it is worth cautioning that participation is 
closely linked to questions of representation and accountability. Questions about accountability and 
representation are indeed complex issues, fraught with dilemmas and ambiguities (Przeworski, 
Stokes et al. 1999). This is not the place for an in-depth discussion about these complex principles, 
but some questions would set the stage:  
• Who is represented in the supposed participatory institutions? In other words, which 
constituencies of the citizenry are represented? In common-place parlance, a local 
government would not be considered “participatory” if only a small minority – like local 
elites – participated.  
• Do the CACS members represent anyone but themselves if they are invited to the council, 
rather than elected by some constituency (that is, those they purportedly represent)? Are 
they accountable to their supposed constituencies? Do they share information about 
proceedings and decisions in the council? 
                                                     
13 Some very interesting experiences have been done in Mozambique with ambitious reforms and institutional engineering 
in the area of participatory local governance and local planning and financing – in a local government institutional context 
quite comparable to that in Angola. However, after almost 15 years of experiences, many achievements have been made, 
yet serious obstacles to increased popular participation have also become apparent (Hodges and Tibana 2005; Åkesson 
and Nilsson 2006; Forquilha 2008; Forquilha 2008). 
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• To which extent do representatives meaningfully participate in governance (that is, having 
at least some influence over the executive) if deliberative powers are ruled out a priori, as 
in Angola.14  
 
What can be brought out from the case of Kalandula with regard to representation is that 
representation is heavily dominated by the state agents, that is, the Administration staff, and other 
units universally associated with the party-state. The dominance becomes even clearer if one 
considers that the regedores who are CACS members are part of the party-state complex. The 
regedores are, after all, in the category of “traditional authorities” closely linked to the state (as paid 
agents, and more commonly than not appointed by the Administrator). Furthermore, it is highly 
problematic to simply assume, as many clearly do in Kalandula, that traditional authorities simply 
represent their “communities”, a much to simplified interpretation of their role in the villages and 
in-between the rural populations and the local administrations. The very concept of “community” 
has also been criticised as an abstract reification of population concentrations which are 
heterogeneous and ridden by internal conflicts. These problems have been amply discussed in other 
African settings (Buur and Kyed 2005; Kyed and Buur 2007). 
 
Even some of the “civil society”-representatives are probably very close to the party-state apparatus 
(like in the case of deputado Monteiro Kapunga and the Women’s Representative). It is deeply 
problematic, from a democratization point of view, that there is such a high concentration of 
elements closely associated with the state and the ruling party present in the CACS.  
 
Briefly put, it is theoretically possible, though in practice usually unlikely, that one party entrenched 
in the executive can effectively communicate with and represent the interests of all sectors of 
society. It is after all so that when we speak of representatives in a participatory assembly, then 
these representatives should represent and present someone’s interests before the state – which is 
paradoxical if they are simultaneously personally part of the state apparatus.   
 
The same dilemma counts for the accountability functions of the council. If nearly all members are 
very close to the ruling party and the state apparatus, it is unlikely that they will serve as watch-dogs 
on that state.  
 
With weak representation, and weak accountability functions of the council, it is also difficult to see 
how the CACS could contribute much – in its own right – to making governance responsive to 
popular interests. This does not amount to an accusation that the Administration is wholly 
unresponsive, as there are other mechanisms – like pragmatic attention to the issue or ideology, for 
instance – which can ensure responsiveness. 
 
In a short conclusion, and to answer the title question, one could say that the observations of the 
CACS experiences in Kalandula indicate the following: That the seeds have been sown in the 
administration as well as in some parts of civil society in Kalandula town for the expectation of 
some increased inclusion and voice by representatives of the local citizenry. Yet, the institution of 
the CACS is still embryonic and feeble, and it will take much institutionalisation as yet to transform 
this expectation into leverage that de facto increases the accountability of local government before 
the local citizenry – if indeed, the CACS institutions in their current form survive political 
development beyond the next few years. 
                                                     
14 Actually, the word participation only occurs in Article 3 of the law-decree 2/07, stating that the local organs of the state 
are ruled by the principles of ‘administrative deconcentration, legality, differentiation, transfer of resources, 
temporariness, and participation and collegiality’. There is no other reference to how participation – or by whom – 
participation in governance should take place.  
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Annex– the legal parameters 
CAPITULO IV 
Organização em especial 
SECÇÃO I 
Órgão de apoio consultivo 
ARTIGO 54º. 
(Conselho Municipal de auscultação e concertação social) 
 
1 Conselho Municipal de Auscultação e Concertação Social, tem por objectivo apoiar a 
Administração Municipal na apreciação e tomada de medidas de natureza politica, económica e 
social no território do respectivo Município. 
2 Para efeitos de aplicação do disposto no nº.1 deste artigo, o Conselho Municipal de Auscultação 
e Concertação Social deve ser ouvido antes de aprovação do programa de desenvolvimento 
Municipal, do plano de actividades e do relatório de execução dos referidos instrumentos. 
3 O Conselho Municipal de Auscultação e Concertação Social é presidido pelo Administrador 
Municipal e integra os seguintes membros: 
a) Administrador Municipal Adjunto; 
b) Administradores Comunais; 
c) Chefe de Repartição Municipal; 
d) Representantes de Autoridades Tradicionais; 
e) Representantes do Sector Empresarial Público e Privado; 
f) Representantes das Associações de Camponeses; 
g) Representantes das Igrejas reconhecidas por lei; 
h) Representantes das ONG´s. 
4 Sempre que julgue necessário o Administrador Municipal pode convidar outras entidades não 
contempladas no número anterior. 
5 Quanto às competências, organização e funcionamento, são aplicáveis as disposições do 
respectivo regulamento interno. 
6 O Conselho Municipal de Auscultação e Concertação Social reúnese ordinariamente de três em 
três meses e extraordinariamente sempre que o Administrador Municipal o convocar. 
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Annex – monthly subsidies for traditional authorities in 
Malanje, Oct 2008 
Monthly subsidies Nr.  Rate AKZ Sum AKZ Sum USD 
Soba grande (regedor) 250     20 397    5 099 250        67 990  
Soba grande assistant 248     13 032    3 231 936        43 092  
Soba 1422     18 357  26 103 654     348 049  
Soba assistant 1277     10 199  13 024 123     173 655  
Sekúlo 1932     16 317  31 524 444     420 326  
      78 983 407  1 053 112  
AKZ/USD : 75/1      
Source: Governo Provincial de Malanje 
The number column refers to number of traditional authorities in each category who receives 
monthly subsidies. The term “subsidy” is consistently used with reference to the payment to 
the traditional authorities, as if to avoid the term “salary” – which would have implied that 
there is a fixed employment contract between the state and the traditional authorities.  
Glossary and abbreviations 
PORTUGUESE ENLISH 
ADRA  ACÇÃO PARA O DESENVOLVIMENTO RURAL E AMBIENTE. ACTION FOR RURAL 
DEVELOPMENT AND THE ENVIRONMENT. ANGOLAN NGO 
CACS CONSELHO DE AUSCULTAÇÃO E CONCERTAÇÃO SOCIAL. COUNCIL OF COMMUNITY 
CONSULTATION AND COOPERATION. 
COMUNA LOCAL ORGAN OF THE STATE, NEXT BELOW THE MUNICIPIO (NOT TO BE CONFUSED 
WITH A LOCALLY ELECTED “COMMUNE” COMMON IN EUROPE AND ELSEWHERE). 
HEADED BY AN APPOINTED ADMINISTRATOR. 
MECANAGRO STATE COMPANY TO PROMOTE MECHANISATION OF AGRICULTURE 
MUNICÍPIO LOCAL ORGAN OF THE STATE, NEXT BELOW THE PROVINCE (NOT TO BE CONFUSED 
WITH A LOCALLY ELECTED “MUNICIPALITY” COMMON IN EUROPE AND ELSEWHERE). 
HEADED BY AN APPOINTED ADMINISTRATOR. 
PALÁCIO PALACE. THE OFFICIAL RESIDENCE OF THE ADMINISTRATOR IS IN ANGOLA, BY 
COLONIAL TRADITION, REFERRED TO AS THE PALÁCIO.  
PROVINCE ANGOLA IS DIVIDED INTO 18 PROVINCES, EACH HEADED BY A GOVERNOR WHO IS 
DIRECTLY APPOINTED BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC. THE GOVERNOR PRESIDES 
OVER A PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENT WITH COMPARATIVELY LITTLE FINANCIAL AND 
POLITICAL AUTONOMY. 
REGEDOR HEAD SOBA, APPOINTED FROM THE RANKS OF THE SOBAS TO BE THE PRIME CONTACT 
POINT WITH THE LOCAL STATE ADMINISTRATION. 
REGEDORIA DIVISION OF TERRITORY AND JURISDICTION OF A PARTICULAR REGEDOR. 
SOBA GENERIC TERM REFERRING TO THE MOST COMMON TYPE OF TRADITIONAL AUTHORITY, 
USUALLY AT VILLAGE LEVEL. 
 




Date Name Posititon 
Oct 29 Rui Roque Director da ADRA, Antena de Benguela 
Oct 30 Domingos Issanzu Reserach of Social Action, based in Katandula (ADRA) 
Oct 30 Lucas Lucamba Coordandor, projecto Balamuka, ADRA Katandula 
Oct 30 Nelo Monteiro Consultor para o Município de Kalandula, IEPALA 
Oct 31 João Joaquim Pedro Administrador  Municipal de Katandula 
Nov 3 Pinto Pedro Vunge Project officer, Intermon Huambo, (previous CDR in 
Kalandula) 
Nov 4 Pedro Dembue Project coordinator, ADRA Quela 
Nov 5 Gaspar Neto Vice-Governador para a Área Económica, Malanje 
Nov 6 Alfredo Dala Director Prov. de Apoio e Controlo às Adm. Municipais e 
Comunais, Malanje 
Nov 6 Angelina Diogo Substituto do Delegado Provincial das Finanças, Malanje 
Nov 6 Cila Monteiro Director Provincial de Plano, Malanje 
Nov 6  Jenuíno Roque Coordenador do Programa de Descentralização, ADRA 
Kalandula 
Nov 6 Simão Paulo Domingos Chefe da Secção das Finanças e Repartição Fiscal, Malanje 
Nov 8 Padre Viana Missão Católica de Kalandula 
Nov 9 Regedor João Pascoal Regedor da Área João Pascoal 
Nov 10 João da Cruz Secretário Área Administrativa, Unita Kalandula 
Nov 12 Joana Macudy Comerciante, Kalandula 
Nov 12 Miguel Mangueira Funcionario da Secretaria da Administração Mun., Kalandula 
Nov 13 José Kalandula Regedor adjunto, Kalandula de Baixo, Kalandula 
Nov 13  Tomé Dias de Sousa Chefe da Secção de Agricultura, Kalandula 
Nov 14 Finesa Moyo Coordenadora do programa HIV/SIDA, ADRA Kalandula 
Nov 14 Guilhermina Diva Coordenadora adjunta do Fórum das Mulheres, Kalandula 
Nov 14 Pedro Ngolome SINFO, Kalandula 
Nov 15 André Futavula Coordenador, Núcleo Representativo das Associações , 
Kalandula 
Nov 15 André Manuel Gaspar Secretário do Regedor João Pascoal, Kalandula 
Nov 16 Benjamin Mendes Comandante da Polícia, Kalandula 
Nov 16 Domingos Kangundo Soba, Bairro Kazela, Kalandula (group interview) 
Nov 16 Dona Laurinda Comerciante, Kalandula  
Nov 17 Ernesto Manuel Administrador Comunal de Kateco-Kangola 
Nov 17 Pedro Brandão Chefe de Gabinete, Administrador Municipal, Malanje 
Nov 18 Filipe Windua Secretário provincial do PRD, Malanje 
Nov 18 Santos Magalhães Secretário Provincial de Unita, Provincia de Malanje 
Nov 19 João Daniel Secretário provincial do PRS, Malanje 
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